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PATENTS AND PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
In their article “Patenting Foundational Technologies:
Lessons From CRISPR and Other Core Biotechnologies,”
Feeney and colleagues (2018) provide a critical analysis
of Farrelly’s (2016) take on patents. Patents serve to
encourage investments needed to get new biotechnolo-
gies on the market, yet may also raise distributive justice
concerns by delaying development and limiting access to
the patented technology, as Feeney and colleagues (2018)
point out. Such inequality in access is particularly prob-
lematic for what they refer to as “foundational” technolo-
gies, given their great promise for both fundamental
research and therapeutic applications. To mitigate these
concerns, a number of ways are suggested to curtail the
exclusivity afforded by patents on foundational technolo-
gies so as to increase access to these technologies. In
doing so, the authors adopt a nonideal perspective
toward patents, taking a real-world starting point.
As Feeney and colleagues (2018) discuss, patents are
“rights of exclusivity” and can thus also be employed to
achieve private governance. Private governance occurs
when certain phenomena, such as the use of new bio-
technologies, are regulated by private agents rather than
through governmental policies. Correspondingly, exclu-
sive rights can give patentees the power to direct others'
use and research for private good, but also for societal
good through so-called “ethical licensing” (Sherkow
2017). The license that Editas Medicine, Inc. (Editas), the
surrogate licensee to which the Broad Institute has out-
sourced its licensing and commercialization rights,
granted to Monsanto (recently acquired by Bayer) is an
example of such ethical licensing. In this license, specific
applications were expressly prohibited, such as the
creation of sterile “terminator” seeds or the conduct of
research aimed at commercializing tobacco products
(Feeney et al. 2018). Similarly, Kevin Esvelt proposed
using gene drive patents to prevent others from using
this technology without disclosing their research plans
and accompanying safety and ethical issues (Guerrini
et al. 2017; Regalado 2016).
While we are sympathetic to the nonideal perspec-
tive adopted by Feeney and colleagues (2018) and agree
that it is important to address the distributive justice
concerns of biotechnology patents, their approach fails
to address concerns of procedural justice raised by the
use of exclusivity rights for private governance. Like
Feeney and colleagues (2018), we consider it praise-
worthy that patentees such as Editas aim to pursue a
socially responsible approach in their licensing agree-
ments, but we argue that using property rights in this
way raises concerns beyond the mere issue with the
voluntariness of adopting a socially responsible
approach that they bring forward. In what follows, we
discuss why this is the case, why procedural justice
matters, and propose a potential solution to mitigate
these concerns.
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Foundational technologies such as CRISPR (clustered
regularly interspaced palindromic repeats) are excep-
tional not only in terms of the promises they hold for
fundamental research and therapeutic applications, but
also in terms of the discussion and disagreement they
generate about what would constitute “socially
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responsible” or “ethical” use of these technologies. As
there is no widely accepted, independent criterion to
determine this, such value pluralism poses a legitimacy
problem: Who should be allowed to decide this, and
under what conditions?
By leaving the determination of what is “socially
responsible” or “ethical” to the sole discretion of the
patentee, ethical licensing through private governance
raises not just distributive justice concerns, but also con-
cerns related to the fairness of this decision-making pro-
cess: concerns of procedural justice. Given the absence of
a widely accepted criterion to determine what counts as
a “socially responsible” or “ethical” application of new
foundational technologies, ethical licensing should foster
broad debate about whether and when these epithets
apply, rather than leaving it solely up to the patentee to
determine this.
We contend that the societal importance of founda-
tional biotechnologies provides a rationale not only to
impose obligations on patentees to increase access to
these technologies, but also to safeguard the fairness of
regulatory processes for the use of these technologies. A
fair process can provide a legitimization for the way in
which decisions about the use of these technologies are
made (Daniels 2008), even though it has been argued
that a fair process does not guarantee that the resulting
outcome is just.
Although it is beyond the scope of this commentary
to specify necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve
procedural justice in ethical licensing, such a process
should at a minimum allow a broader group of stake-
holders, other than just the patentee, to have insight and
influence in those terms of the license that govern accept-
able uses of the technology. Furthermore, the debate
about these restrictions should be made as transparent as
possible, allowing the community at large to hold patent-
ees and licensees accountable for the arrange-
ments made.
ADDRESSING THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
CONCERNS IN ETHICAL LICENSING
In the field of genome editing broadly construed, the
need for stakeholder engagement in the discussion about
the governance, applications and use of these technolo-
gies is widely acknowledged. Among others, Jasanoff
and Hurlbut (2018) have proposed a “global observ-
atory,” an international network of different stakeholders
that should deepen and enrich the debate about biotech-
nologies. Similarly, patent scholars have come up with
proposals to increase responsiveness to societal interests.
Howe (2013), for example, has defended a community-
oriented concept of patents that entails obligations for
patentees on green technologies to contribute to a better
environment, the so-called “stewardship” model.
We acknowledge that different strategies may be
employed to increase procedural justice in ethical
licensing. One solution might be to allow democratically
chosen governments to control or oversee licensing con-
ditions. Given their democratic legitimacy, such govern-
mental involvement could increase procedural justice.
Nevertheless, we believe this solution poses two prob-
lems. First, this approach would strongly compromise
the rights of patentees and thereby threaten the further
development of these technologies in the first place, rais-
ing distributive justice concerns as patentees would be
less likely to invest in new technologies. Second, it
would result in internationally fragmented policies, as
different governments will likely come to different regu-
latory frameworks. A second solution, advanced here,
circumvents these problems by acknowledging that pat-
ents incentivize research investments in biotechnologies
(Farrelly 2016). At the same time, this solution dimin-
ishes problematic characteristics of private governance
by allowing other stakeholders to have insight and influ-
ence in decision making about acceptable use of these
technologies, thereby optimizing the balance between
procedural justice and distributive justice.
Specifically, we suggest creating a platform akin to
the Creative Commons platform in the creative industry.
Creative Commons unites different stakeholders from the
creative industry to formulate a model license, reflecting
what the stakeholders agreed is a fair balance between
the rights of creators and the public. Although the use of
a Creative Commons license is not mandatory and may
be tailored to the wishes of the copyright holder, it has
set a “gold standard” for open licensing of creative con-
tent. Adherence to this gold standard can have important
reputational benefits for copyright holders, in addition to
encouraging widespread dissemination of their work.
A similar process could be facilitated by a platform
that brings together stakeholders from the CRISPR com-
munity, including scientists, research institutes, patient
organizations, and pharmaceutical companies, such as
the one proposed by Jasanoff and Hurlbut (2018). Even
in the absence of full agreement on the ethical use of a
technology such as CRISPR, these stakeholders could
jointly formulate a guideline in which consensus is speci-
fied. As mentioned previously, this platform should be
open to the public to the extent possible to allow public
scrutiny of (debates on) the contents of the guideline.
The best practices thus formulated could become a
guideline for ethical use of CRISPR technology and a
model license for those wishing to license
the technology.
Of course, the voluntariness of committing to such a
platform’s blueprint license poses problems. These prob-
lems might be alleviated by making government grants
conditional on the recipient's commitment to the plat-
form's principles, among other solutions. Moreover, the
shift toward more openness and societally responsible
use of intellectual property that has been observed over
the past years in various industries, such as the publish-
ing industry, stems hopeful. Within the CRISPR commu-
nity, the example of Editas shows that also in this
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industry, patentees are receptive to societal interests and
appear willing to take them into account in the execution
of their rights.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
By leaving the determination of “socially responsible”
use of foundational technologies to the sole discretion of
the patentee, ethical licensing through private govern-
ance raises concerns of procedural justice. It is imperative
to urge the pursuit of policies that encourage broader
insight and influence in this process, such as the one
advanced here, to ensure legitimate decision making on
technologies that have broad societal impact.
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Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah
Feeney and colleagues (2018) identify an issue that has
been widely discussed in the literature: the potential
impact of patents on the dissemination and use of
CRISPR gene editing technology (Contreras and Sherkow
2017; Contreras 2018). By looking at the manner in which
two earlier technologies—recombinant DNA and the
polymerase chain reaction (PCR)—were handled, they
seek to derive “recommendations for realistic and work-
able guidelines for patenting and licensing” of CRISPR
technology (36). Throughout, they seek to rebut
Farrelly’s argument (2016. Biologically Modified Justice.
UK: Blackwell) that patents serve a moral function by
incentivizing the development of socially valuable
innovations.
Feeney, et al. begin by characterizing CRISPR as a
“foundational technology” (36), which they define as a
technology that “rarely yield[s] direct societal benefit,
but constitute[s an] important tool[] for further research”
(37). In the literature, such technologies are commonly
referred to as “research tools”—basic scientific
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